Truth in Perspective | Ibrahim Shglawi America… When Will It Learn?

The U.S. State Department confirmed on Sunday Washington’s readiness to support a “comprehensive, civilian-led Sudanese dialogue,” with the participation of Sudanese people, including internally displaced persons and refugees, and in a location agreed upon by the parties. This comes following President Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s initiative to launch a Sudanese dialogue inside the country, revealing a divergence in the two visions.

 Washington does not reject dialogue, but it is redefining its conditions, leadership, and venue, in a signal that reflects the extent of American pressure on the country’s political decision-making.

Therefore, the battle over political dialogue is no longer less complicated than the battle for dignity, as it has moved from simply sitting at the table to having the right to shape it, set its agenda, and participate in it. Since the fall of al-Bashir in 2019, our country has witnessed repeated attempts to engineer the transition, involving international and regional powers, with Washington among the most prominent actors, through tracks that included the Constitutional Document, the Lawyers’ Draft Constitution, and the Framework Agreement. After all these experiences, the assessment of the results was a major failure, producing not even the minimum of possible approaches.

The result was neither a stable state nor consensus over legitimacy, but rather continued division, multiple centers of power, and a political deadlock that ultimately led to the April 2023 war. This does not mean holding Washington solely responsible for what happened, as the crisis is the product of elite mistakes, state fragility, and the struggle for power. But this does not exempt international approaches and ambitions from criticism. Intervention that failed to build consensus contributed—intentionally or unintentionally—to complicating the political scene. Therefore, what we need today is a serious review, not a reproduction of the same tools.

It is well known that the war redrew the maps of power in Sudan, and the country is no longer a place whose crises can be managed from embassy rooms. The balance of power inside the country has changed, Sudanese awareness of the risks of state fragmentation has increased, and the state and the army have returned to the center of the scene. Meanwhile, the limitations of forces whose external presence was inflated at the expense of their lack of popular weight have been exposed. In contrast, a broader concept of civilians has emerged, as a genuine national force confronting attempts to seize the state.

Yet this important transformation has not been reflected in the approaches of some international powers seeking resources and influence, which continue to try to shape the political process from abroad by selecting parties that had no genuine popular weight and granting them negotiating weight through international sponsorship.

 Here lies the danger of reproducing old, failed tools in a new and changing reality. External sponsorship cannot create representation, nor can it grant legitimacy to those who have not earned it within society.

This is the point at which Washington should pause for a long time: democracy does not mean that the United States chooses, in the name of democracy, who represents the Sudanese people. Political decision-making does not become democratic if the components of dialogue are designed from abroad, forces that do not please Washington are excluded, and others are promoted.

If Washington truly believes that Sudan’s future should be decided by its people, it must translate that belief into action; otherwise, the call for democracy becomes soft guardianship.

The war has proven that a state without a unified national military institution becomes vulnerable to being seized by any armed force capable of imposing its will. Therefore, the correct equation is not: army or democracy, but rather a democratic state with a unified national army that monopolizes the legitimate use of force, submits to the constitution without monopolizing politics, while the state simultaneously refuses to allow a parallel army to exist alongside it.

Here lies the paradox that Washington must consider: the institution that was portrayed as weak, divided, and incapable of prevailing managed to endure and regain control of large areas of the country’s states. This makes it politically difficult to treat it as an entity that can be bypassed in Sudan’s future arrangements. The state’s military resilience has returned the army to the heart of the state equation, as one of the components of the nation’s structure that cannot be bypassed.

Certainly, Sudan does not reject the international community. Rather, it needs its humanitarian, economic, political, and developmental support, as well as balanced relations with Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Riyadh, Cairo, Addis Ababa, and others. But it needs these as partnerships between sovereign states, not as a relationship between a guardian and a minor. Democracy begins when Sudanese people possess the right to choose whom to negotiate with, who represents them, and who governs them.

Therefore, the dialogue called for by al-Burhan is an opportunity to reclaim Sudanese politics from abroad, if it is properly designed. What is required is an open dialogue, not a selective one; a dialogue in which Sudanese people participate according to clear criteria, not according to lists prepared by embassies. The objective should not be to reproduce a power-sharing government, but to establish new foundations for the state: one national army, an elected civilian authority, independent institutions, the rule of law, and justice that excludes no one.

At the same time, political forces must assume their responsibility before history. One cannot reject American guardianship and then seek its support against political opponents. Nor can one speak of national sovereignty while some political positions are managed from abroad. Independence in decision-making is indivisible. Whoever wants to be a partner in shaping the new Sudan must have the courage to disagree with the outside world just as they have the courage to engage in dialogue at home, and then be prepared to submit to the will of the people.

The time has come for Washington to learn a simple but important lesson: Sudan is not a political vacuum, and the Sudanese people are not raw material for transition projects designed by think tanks and foreign capitals.

 Sudanese people may disagree about everything, but ultimately they agree on their right to have their decisions made inside the country.

If Washington wants to help Sudan, let it pressure the countries fueling the war with weapons, support the protection of civilians, back reconstruction, and help restore the economy and institutions. As for determining who represents Sudan, who holds legitimacy, and how the state should be built, these are matters Washington cannot take away from the Sudanese without turning democracy itself into an instrument of influence.

According to #TruthInPerspective, the Sudanese have thwarted attempts to seize their state, paying a heavy price to affirm that Sudan is no one’s project. Today, the battle for the political process begins with Sudanese will, not foreign prescriptions. If America wants to help, let it support dialogue, rather than negotiate with Sudanese people by proxy or on their behalf. Democracy cannot be engineered from abroad, and peace cannot endure unless it is endorsed by the Sudanese.

Sudan has paid a heavy price for the guardianship of foreign capitals, and the time has come for Washington to learn that partnership begins with respect for the will of the people. America… when will it learn that the best thing it can do for Sudan is to leave Sudanese people the right to shape their own future?

May you remain in good health and well-being.

Saturday, August 22, 2026 Shglawi55@gmail.com