أعمدة الرأي

Face of the Truth | Ibrahim Shaglawi The Blood of El Fasher: A Curse Haunting the “Ta’sis” Alliance…

The United Nations report issued yesterday on the city of El Fasher revealed a horrific wave of violence committed by the Rapid Support Forces militia and its allies, which claimed the lives of thousands of civilians within just a few days. The atrocities included mass executions, systematic sexual violence, and the use of starvation as a weapon of war.

The UN investigations confirmed that these crimes are not isolated incidents, but rather a systematic pattern targeting civilians on ethnic grounds, amid ongoing impunity that fuels cycles of violence. The international community thus finds itself facing a real test: either to move to stop the flow of weapons, hold those responsible accountable, and designate the Rapid Support Forces militia as a terrorist organization — or allow the tragedy to repeat itself.

The numbers alone are shocking: more than 6,000 people were killed during the first three days of the attack on El Fasher, including 4,400 inside the city and 1,600 while attempting to flee, with the possibility that the actual number is far higher over the week-long assault on the steadfast city over the past two years.

This figure is not merely a statistic, but an indicator of a deliberate pattern of organized terrorism and war crimes, and the targeting of civilians on an ethnic basis.

In this context, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, affirmed that impunity is the main driver behind the continued violence in the region — and in El Fasher in particular — calling for independent investigations to determine the criminal responsibility of leaders and senior officials, in a manner that restores the meaning of justice and lays the foundation for a national path that protects civilians and establishes sustainable civilian governance.

Politically, the Sudan Founding Alliance that seeks to justify these crimes is nothing more than a political façade for an armed force that imposes its control through violence.

 Talking about “civilian rule” in areas effectively under militia control remains a hollow discourse, because decision-making, weapons, and resources lie outside the framework of the state and the rule of law.

Therefore, this alliance must bear political and legal responsibility. This is not a targeting campaign, but a direct reading of a reality that reduces authority to armed power, replacing institutions with the legitimacy of innocent blood.

 Any project built on this foundation remains fragile, as it does not rest on popular acceptance or national institutions.

In contrast, developments in North Kordofan reflect different signals, as a group of former militia affiliates returned to the side of the state, in a scene that carried significant implications about the possibility of restoring national loyalty whenever institutions capable of inclusion and legal accountability are present.

These transformations reveal that militia-based authoritarian projects cannot endure long if they lack social legitimacy.

The returning commander, Maki Al-Tijani, confirmed that the decision to return was based on full conviction and a sincere response to the call of the homeland, noting that the “Ta’sis” government does not exist on the ground, and is merely a political front for militia interests that do not reflect citizens’ aspirations.

This return exposes the fragility of this alliance, its inability to maintain the loyalty of its followers or impose its will on the ground, and reflects that political loyalty in Sudan has remained aligned with the legitimate state led by the Sovereignty Council.

The governor welcomed the returnees, affirming that the homeland has room for all, and that the current phase requires unified efforts and national cohesion to achieve security and stability and build Sudan, praising the vital role of traditional administration and the General Intelligence Service in facilitating the return and enhancing stability.

 This step demonstrates that sustainable security and political solutions will only come through state institutions, not through false political fronts or armed militias — a practical lesson drawn from the failure of the Ta’sis Alliance to manage its areas of influence or win popular loyalty.

Externally, pressure on the militia is increasing. The U.S.

 House Committee on Foreign Affairs condemned the UAE’s support for a training camp linked to the Rapid Support Forces in Ethiopia, and threatened to continue suspending arms sales to any state that supports it. Meanwhile, the African Union Peace and Security Council, meeting yesterday in Addis Ababa, called for a boycott of the Rapid Support Forces and rejected any parallel entities in Sudan, affirming that the unity and sovereignty of the country are non-negotiable.

Reports also indicate that the camp in Ethiopia includes a drone control center and around 4,300 fighters, signaling the expanding regional dimension of the conflict and the possibility of its southward spread. If this regional aspect does not face international condemnation, it will deepen the crisis and make any national solution — if it does not proceed swiftly through military resolution — also dependent on effective international pressure on external backers.

The number 6,000 encapsulates the tragedy, but it also tests international law. It equally tests Sudanese judicial institutions: a state that fails to protect its citizens loses its essence, and alliances that build their projects solely on armed force remain hostage to weapons rather than the rule of law.

The central question, according to #Face_of_the_Truth, remains: Will the international community and regional powers be able to impose the law on this militia, prevent its supporters from arming it, and strip the Ta’sis Alliance of its false political façade? Or will Sudan remain an arena for conflict between rogue power and civil rights, between impunity and the blood of thousands of victims? This question represents a practical test of the ability of the government and the international community to establish stable governance, enforce the law, and restore the legitimacy of state institutions in the face of violence and chaos.

Stay well and safe.

Sunday, 15 February 2026

زر الذهاب إلى الأعلى