The Truth Behind the Scene | Dr. Ibrahim Shaqlawi Sudan and the Difficult Conditions for Peace

On Thursday, the Permanent Mission of Sudan to the United Nations in New York welcomed, in a press statement, the Security Council’s decision to extend the measures imposed under Resolution 1591 for sixty days, while maintaining their existing geographical scope and substance. The statement stressed that priority should be given to activating the existing sanctions regime, ensuring compliance with and implementation of its provisions, and holding violators accountable, rather than expanding it. It also declared Sudan’s readiness to engage constructively in any substantive discussion aimed at enhancing its effectiveness, away from politicization, selectivity, and equating the state and its legitimate institutions with militias and mercenary armed groups.

Notably, the decision came amid international disagreement over expanding the arms embargo to cover the entire country, including drones and dual-use technologies. The Council ultimately extended the sanctions regime until December 11 and the mandate of the Panel of Experts until January 11, 2027, without resolving the disagreement over expansion. But the question that goes beyond the details of the decision is this: Does the international community want to end the war, or to manage its balance of forces and postpone its next explosion to another date?

This is where the importance of Sudan’s position becomes apparent: declaring readiness for international cooperation while insisting that the war must end under conditions that address the roots of the crisis. Cooperation does not mean relinquishing the state’s right to determine its future, just as sovereignty does not mean closing the door to international efforts. What is required is to shift the relationship with the international community from defending positions to presenting a clear peace initiative that defines commitments and guarantees, making the end of the war a goal rather than merely a slogan.

For Khartoum, the fundamental issue lies in distinguishing between a truce that temporarily halts the fighting and a comprehensive cessation that ends the war. A truce may freeze the fighting without ending the conflict; it may even allow the militia to reorganize its forces, as happened during previous truces.

In a country exhausted by war, whose cities have been destroyed and whose population has been displaced, halting the fighting without ending the militia’s armed control and addressing the roots of the crisis could shift the conflict from the battlefield into politics and society, which has already made its rejection of the militia’s presence clear. This would entrench division rather than pave the way for restoring the state and ending the war.

A comprehensive end to the war cannot be achieved merely by declaring a ceasefire. It requires the withdrawal of militia forces from cities and their assembly in designated camps, in preparation for disarmament and demobilization, with those who meet the requirements allowed to join the regular forces and the others returning to civilian life. The issue here is not integrating the militia into a political settlement, but ending its military presence. It is a rebellious military faction, not a political force entitled to participate in power-sharing.

This approach is grounded in the Jeddah Declaration, which stipulated the implementation of commitments concerning the protection of civilians, the evacuation of civilian facilities, and the assembly of forces in preparation for demobilization and reintegration. The objective is to end the existence of an armed force operating in parallel with the state, so that a settlement does not become a means of restoring the militia, and negotiations do not become a vehicle for reproducing the conditions that led to the war. The state does not recover its strength merely by stopping the fighting; it does so by restoring its institutional unity and its legitimate monopoly over arms.

Here lies the real political test: Will a settlement be built on addressing the causes of the war, or on regional and international pressure? A settlement that ignores the fate of weapons outside state institutions may provide temporary calm, but it leaves open the possibility of a return to fighting. Conversely, security arrangements alone, without protecting civilians, facilitating the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, addressing grievances, and opening the way for a broader political settlement, will not produce sustainable peace.

What is required is two parallel and complementary tracks: ending the armed rebellion and addressing the political and social roots of the crisis within a single state with unified institutions.

As for the allegations concerning the use of chemical weapons, they should be addressed through an independent investigation and the competent institutions, while giving Sudan the opportunity to cooperate and present its position. However, this issue should not obscure the central question concerning the future of the war and the conditions for ending it. International positions should be assessed according to the extent to which they contribute to protecting civilians, preventing the flow of weapons to the militia, and supporting a settlement that restores the state’s ability to maintain security.

Extending sanctions does not constitute a solution to the crisis, just as expanding the arms embargo does not guarantee an end to it, given that such an expansion equates the national army with the forces rebelling against it. Therefore, Khartoum’s readiness to cooperate must be transformed into a clear political and diplomatic initiative that holds the international community to its commitments and advances a comprehensive cessation of hostilities linked to the withdrawal of rebel forces from cities and their assembly in camps, under guarantees and established verification mechanisms determined by the Sudanese government.

Sudan today, therefore, as The Truth Behind the Scene sees it, faces difficult conditions for peace. The challenge is not merely to stop or win the war, but to prevent it from being reproduced in another form. A truce may stop the bullets, but it does not necessarily end the conflict. Peace begins when the realities that made the war possible are transformed, the state regains its unity and authority over its territory, and citizens find a safe path back to their lives. That is the difference between a peace that postpones the crisis and one that opens the way to ending it.

May you remain in good health and well-being.

Saturday, October 10, 2026

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