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The Face of Truth | Dr. Ibrahim Shaglawi Hemedti… The End of a Project on Which the People of the Overturned Cities Placed Their Bets

The rapidly unfolding developments in the Kordofan region do not appear to be merely military shifts in the geography of the war. Rather, they reveal a pivotal phase in which the rebellious Rapid Support Forces militia is approaching the end of its military and political project, under the pressure of the Armed Forces’ advances and the fragmentation of its leadership, military, and social structure.

The current scene is not solely about the fate of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, but also about the future of the domestic and external bets surrounding the militia’s emergence and expansion of influence, which turned it into a force parallel to the state, before its project evolved into a war for which the Sudanese people paid dearly in terms of their security and stability, through bloodshed, displacement, and destruction.

Hemedti’s arrival in Ghabish, in West Kordofan, yesterday, according to sources, amid tight security arrangements and following strikes targeting his forces’ convoys, carries significant implications. The advances of the Armed Forces and supporting forces, the recapture of Al-Khuwai and several strategically important areas, alongside the destruction of combat vehicles, the cutting of supply lines, and the neutralization of command and control centers, all point to a shift in the military initiative and a narrowing of the militia’s room for manoeuvre. These developments derive their significance from Kordofan’s geographical and economic position as a strategic junction connecting central Sudan with its west and serving as a corridor towards Darfur.

Therefore, the battle for Al-Nuhud is not merely a race to control the city, but rather a demonstration of the army’s ability to reclaim the state’s geographical and economic depth.

However, the most significant transformation is taking place within the militia’s own structure. Defections have been occurring successively, involving prominent leaders, including, at earlier stages, Al-Nour Al-Qubba, Al-Safina, Al-Tayeb Al-Wahido, Mohamed Azraq Al-Fanjari, and Sadiq Ander, alongside other groups, officers, and field commanders. The latest of these was Abdel Qader Daw Al-Bait, yesterday.

The significance of these departures lies not merely in the number of commanders involved, but in the nature of the positions they held and the formations they led. When a commander leaves with his men and weapons, the militia does not simply lose personnel; it loses part of its organizational structure, field experience, and capacity to maintain control over loyalties. In my assessment, the coincidence of these defections with mounting military pressure reveals a serious crisis within the leadership, alongside declining confidence in the project and its eventual outcomes.

Conversely, the positions of local communities in Kordofan and citizens’ aspirations for the army’s return reflect an indication that, in the public conscience, this battle is linked to the restoration of security and peace. Across vast areas, Sudanese people have endured the horrors of violations, killings, looting, and displacement. The return of state institutions has therefore become a necessity for protecting lives and restoring security and stability.

The extension of confrontations into Blue Nile State reveals that the militia and its allies may still possess the capacity to open new fronts and attempt to disperse the Armed Forces. This requires reading the battles within their broader context, while recognizing that military advances need strategic management capable of protecting gains and preventing their exhaustion.

Politically, developments within Hemedti’s inner circle, including the release of his former adviser, Youssef Ezzat, following his detention in Chad, once again draw attention to the troubled relationship between the military leadership and the political arms responsible for presenting the militia’s narrative and managing its external communications. These are additional indicators of the broader fragmentation, although they are not, on their own, sufficient to determine the future of that network.

Yet the more important question extends beyond Hemedti to those who placed their bets on his project. Certain domestic political forces treated the militia as a tool for reshaping power and its balances, while external parties viewed it as an entry point for influence and strategic and economic interests, alongside networks linked to financing the war and exploiting resources. It is therefore necessary to hold the different actors accountable: Who provided the political cover? Who supplied the support and military logistics? And who benefited from the war economy?

Here, perhaps, the title of our article becomes clearer. The term Al-Mu’tafikat appears in the Holy Qur’an as a description of the cities of the people of Lot, which were overturned, in a context that invites reflection on the consequences of tyranny. The project on which certain parties placed their bets to reshape Sudan and its balance of power ultimately led to a war that turned against the very calculations of those behind it, threatening the state, society, and the interests they believed they could attain. It is a shameful paradox: a project intended to serve as an instrument for restructuring power so that it would become indebted to them, only to turn into a force for dismantling the state and undermining the calculations of its architects.

In my assessment, from the perspective of #The_Face_of_Truth, what is unfolding in Kordofan goes beyond developments on the battlefield to expose the strategic predicament of Hemedti’s project, on which the people of the overturned cities had placed their bets to change the equation of the Sudanese state. Its military end may be approaching, but the completion of that end remains contingent upon dismantling its networks, structure, and sources of financing, holding those involved in its crimes accountable, and closing the avenues through which it could be reproduced.

Sudan does not merely need to defeat the militia on the battlefield; it also needs to restore the state’s monopoly over the use of force, decision-making, and sovereignty, so that Hemedti’s adventure does not come to an end while the project he carried remains capable of returning under new faces and different names.

May you remain in good health and well-being.

Tuesday, 17 November 2026

Shglawi55@gmail.com

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