The Truth Perspective | Ibrahim Shaglawi Sudan… The Auction of Politics and the Curse of Power

There are countries whose wealth becomes a blessing because they possess institutions capable of protecting it, while in other countries, wealth turns into a curse that invites conflict and external intervention. Sudan, since its independence on January 1, 1956, appears to have remained trapped between these two destinies: a nation endowed by God with abundant resources, yet unable to build a political system capable of managing them. As a result, power became an end in itself, and politics turned into an open marketplace for domestic and external bargaining.
Sudan is a nation deeply rooted in history. God has blessed it with vast agricultural lands, abundant water resources, immense mineral wealth, and an exceptional geopolitical location linking the Arab world with Africa, with a coastline stretching approximately 820 kilometers along the Red Sea. These are assets that could have made Sudan an influential regional power. However, the country’s political elites, both civilian and military, placed the struggle for power above the project of state-building, turning Sudan’s crisis into one of institutions and governance, rather than one of resources or potential.
Thus, from the earliest years of independence, the central question was never: How do we build a modern state? Instead, it was: Who rules? Between these two questions, seven decades of the nation’s life were lost. This is how the curse of power took shape in Sudan. A coup followed by a political transition, a transition leading to partisan division, then a fragile government, followed by a security crisis, then a return to military rule, and the cycle begins anew. Governments changed, slogans shifted, but the political mindset remained captive to the same idea: that power is a prize without responsibility, and that the state is merely a vehicle for influence rather than a framework for development and justice.
Geography has granted our country rare advantages in terms of location and resources. Yet the weakness of the state and its institutions squandered these advantages. Instead of serving as the foundation for development and national advancement, they became an arena for local, regional, and international competition. The very resources that should have financed development became part of the economy of war.
Against this backdrop, the current war cannot be understood in isolation. It is not merely an internal rebellion against authority, but a conflict in which local interests have become intertwined with regional and international calculations. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk has pointed out that greed for resources is one of the factors fueling the conflict, indicating that natural wealth—particularly gold and other economic resources—has become part of the equation of war and influence.
Yet placing the entire blame on external actors is an incomplete reading of the crisis. Foreign powers do not create vacuums; rather, they penetrate them and exploit their fragility. The core of the crisis lies not only in the scale of foreign intervention but also in the internal structure that weakened the state and opened the door to external influence and political polarization. The weaker the institutions and the national capacity to manage internal differences, the wider the space for intervention, making the domestic arena a gateway for external influence.
Since independence, political elites have been more preoccupied with the question of gaining power than with the task of building the state. Coups and political transitions followed one another, governments and alliances changed, yet the political culture remained captive to a single logic: power is a prize, the state is a means, and citizenship is a privilege determined by the balance of power.
Nor was this failure the responsibility of one side alone. Civilian and military forces alike failed to build a national project in which institutions and development would take precedence over struggles for influence. Politics shifted from competition over programs for governing the state to a struggle for power, while the priorities of the economy, education, healthcare, agriculture, and production declined. This created fertile ground for external intervention to expand. Sudan, because of its location and wealth, became a target not only for its resources but also for efforts to shape the country’s future and determine the form of its next political order.
Throughout the various transitional periods, external approaches emerged that dealt with Sudan’s political landscape selectively, supporting certain forces while excluding others according to regional and international calculations. Among the most controversial issues has been the treatment of certain political currents as being excluded from the political equation in advance, rather than allowing voters to decide through the ballot box. Yet the essence of democracy lies in the people’s right to choose their representatives. Political exclusion should not result from external decisions but from free competition governed by the constitution and the rule of law. Democracy is not merely about elections; it is about respecting the will of society in all its diversity, as long as political competition remains peaceful and constitutional.
Sudan’s dilemma has never been the scarcity of its resources, but rather the weakness of the state in managing them. External interests are a natural part of international relations, but institutional fragility has undermined the country’s ability to protect its sovereignty. Therefore, recovery cannot begin merely by ending the war and forming a new government. It must begin by rebuilding the very concept of politics, so that power becomes a means of building the state, political parties become instruments for shaping public policy, and the state becomes an inclusive national framework rather than an arena for conflict and political quotas.
According to #The_Truth_Perspective, Sudan’s crisis has never been the absence of resources, but the state’s inability to manage its wealth and transform it into national strength. Great wealth attracted the ambitions of others, while politics was exhausted by struggles for power. The result was a curse that weakened the state and a political auction that squandered its opportunities. The way out of this impasse begins with rebuilding the state on the foundations of strong institutions and the rule of law, and transforming political competition from a struggle over power into a project for nation-building. When power becomes a means of serving the nation rather than an end in itself, the curse begins to fade, and the state begins to rise.
Wishing you continued health and well-being.
Sunday, July 26, 2026
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