The Truth Perspective | Ibrahim Shaglawi Islamists… Scenarios of Survival and Exclusion

It is natural for wars to reshape balances of power and public opinion, and Sudan is no exception. Therefore, the issue of the Islamists is no longer merely a dispute over political participation, but a question connected to the country’s future: Who has the right to shape the political space after the war, and who decides who participates and who is excluded?

In this article, we examine the future of the political process and the possible scenarios for moving from war toward a political path that rebuilds the state and lays the foundations for stability.

The accelerating moves toward launching the Sudanese dialogue reveal that the question of participation and exclusion has moved to the heart of the political scene. President Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s call for dialogue, coupled with his call last week to exclude the National Congress, reproduces a question that had already emerged in the Addis Ababa Declaration of Principles, signed on January 2, 2024, between “Taqaddum” and the Rapid Support Forces militia, and was later renewed in the “Sumoud” discourse. Here, the issue goes beyond the form of the transitional government to a more important question: Who has the right to determine the parties to the political process, and who decides who has the right to participate in shaping the future of Sudan and the Sudanese people after the war?

In contrast, the Islamists have repeatedly declared that they do not want to participate in the transitional government, and that access to power should only be through elections. Here lies the paradox between abstaining from participation by political choice and exclusion by a decision of others. The former is a choice made by the movement itself, while the latter raises a larger question about the rules of the political process and who has the right to formulate them and determine its participants.

Hence, waiting for elections appears more complicated. Elections do not begin with ballot boxes, but with the arrangements that precede them: the constitution, the regulating law, political parties, the electoral commission and voter registry, candidacy requirements, funding, and guarantees of competition. Therefore, the absence of a political movement from the transitional government necessarily means its absence from shaping the rules of the transition. The Islamists can reject participation in the transition, but accepting to remain outside it could turn into a delegation of authority to their opponents to formulate the conditions for their return.

Here lies the paradox, and perhaps the most rational approach: no street pressure to impose participation, and no acceptance of exclusion. The Islamists do not need to impose their presence in the transitional government, just as their support for the army should not turn into a political reward. But their absence from power does not mean leaving their opponents alone to formulate the rules of transition and elections, in a way that could make “waiting” a prior acceptance of the conditions for return—or even non-return. What is required is not participation in power, but participation in shaping the rules that govern the country’s future.

Here, the more important question arises: If the objective is a smooth transition, why should the role of the armed forces not be limited to stabilizing the state and protecting its institutions, without managing political competition? The most realistic approach may be to draw inspiration from the experience of Field Marshal Suwar al-Dahab in April 1985: a military council overseeing the transitional period for a short and defined period, alongside a government of non-partisan national competencies managing the executive apparatus and preparing the laws and institutions for free elections on a binding timetable.

Then, the Islamists would not need to enter the transitional government, nor would other forces need to exclude them. Everyone would remain outside the executive authority, and everyone would be inside the political process, with the voter as the final arbiter. There would be no political rewards and no collective exclusion, and participation would neither be imposed nor prevented through quotas or street pressure, but decided through the ballot box.

However, drawing inspiration from Suwar al-Dahab’s experience is fundamentally different from reproducing military rule. The difference lies in the clarity of the endpoint from the outset: a binding time limit, a defined transition, and a temporary civilian government whose mission is to prepare the country for democracy, not confiscate the popular will. An army that enters the transitional phase in order to leave it is different from an army that enters without a deadline for withdrawal. This formula could provide an exit from the political process, whereby the Islamists are neither imposed on the political scene nor excluded from it, and neither “Sumoud” nor any other group monopolizes the shaping of the future. Instead, all forces prepare for elections, while the transition’s task is confined to building a civil democratic state.

This approach is completed by transitional justice based on a clear principle: no collective exclusion and no political immunity. The Islamists, “Sumoud,” and all other political forces are subject to the same law. Anyone proven responsible for crimes or collusion with any armed party should have their case decided before a fair judiciary, not by political decision. Thus, political participation becomes a right regulated by rules, accountability becomes a responsibility determined by the judiciary, and electoral competition ultimately remains in the hands of the people.

Here lies the real test for everyone: If “Sumoud” and other political forces are confident that the public accepts their vision, why should they fear competing with the Islamists through free elections? And if the Islamists are confident in their popular support, why not prove it at the ballot box? The army must also understand that stability does not create political legitimacy; legitimacy derives from popular mandate. Yet elections themselves require clear political and legal guarantees, so that the call to “wait for elections” does not become an indefinite wait with unknown rules and an unknown date.

As for justice and accountability, they must remain outside the engineering of political exclusion. Anyone proven responsible for a crime or corruption should be held accountable before an independent judiciary, without turning individual responsibility into collective condemnation of an entire political movement. When justice is used to settle political scores, it loses its meaning; and when political affiliation becomes a reason for punishment, mutual exclusion becomes a rule that threatens the future of the state.

If the Islamists wish to complete their democratic argument, they must accept the possibility of defeat. The right to compete does not mean the right to rule, nor does army support or popular presence grant them a prior mandate. Their return requires reviewing their experience, opening up to pluralism, separating the religious from the political, accepting accountability, and presenting a clear project for the state and reconstruction. Likewise, one cannot ignore the transformations that the war has brought about in Sudanese public awareness regarding the Rapid Support Forces militia and the political forces associated with it. A settlement may distribute power, but peace rebuilds the state and trust, while democracy alone settles disputes through the ballot boxes.

As for the regional and international dimension, it will remain present through calculations involving the Red Sea, influence, resources, and migration. Yet regional experiences confirm that integrating Islamist movements into the political process, rather than excluding them, can be part of rebuilding the state when accompanied by the rule of law and regional security. The current Syrian experience, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, offers an example worth following in this direction, while avoiding its replication or considering it complete.

Therefore, it is neither appropriate nor patriotic for political forces to seek international support for an inclusive process and then call upon external actors to exclude a political movement. Likewise, Islamists should not rely on external recognition. Legitimacy is built within the state, society, and at the ballot box. Sudan does not need a new monopoly over legitimacy, patriotism, or civilian representation, but rather rules that prevent monopoly and guarantee competition.

After establishing these rules for the political process, the practical question remains: Where could the current path lead? The country’s future will not be determined by intentions alone, but by the nature of the rules upon which the next phase will be built. From here, three possible scenarios can be envisioned, although they differ in their outcomes, they converge in leading toward a political transition, away from the logic of exclusion and the recycling of the crisis?

First: excluding the Islamists from the political process and the transitional government, while redefining the rules of participation in a way that prevents their return through elections. This scenario may provide their opponents with a temporary political gain, but it carries the risk of producing a new form of exclusion. Excluding a broad political movement through political rules does not eliminate its influence; rather, it may push it to seek alternative paths outside democracy.

Second: reintegrating the Islamists and political forces into the political scene without reviewing previous experiences or subjecting individual responsibilities to justice. This may achieve a superficial consensus, but it leaves the causes of the crisis intact and turns the transition into a recycling of elites and conflicts rather than the foundation of a new political system.

Third, and the most balanced: a time-bound transitional phase in which the armed forces protect the state without monopolizing politics, while a government of non-partisan national competencies manages the transition, with everyone subject to the law and transitional justice without exclusion. No party is granted legitimacy in advance. Instead, all are allowed to rebuild their organizations and programs, after which competition is settled through free elections with legal guarantees, so that the ballot box is the arbiter, not weapons, the street, or closed-door arrangements.

According to #The_Truth_Perspective, the issue of the Islamists is not a battle of survival or exclusion, but a test of our country’s ability to build a political system in which no party monopolizes legitimacy and no other is excluded by political decision. What is required is one law, justice that holds individuals—not movements—accountable, and free elections that determine the popular mandate.

May you remain well and in good health.

Thursday, August 13, 2026

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