The Truth Perspective | Ibrahim Shaglawi Ninety-Nine Are Not Enough

The Holy Qur’an has preserved in our collective memory stories that encapsulate the nature of human beings, combining the beauty of narrative with depth of meaning and reflection. Among the most eloquent is the story of a man who owns ninety-nine ewes, yet his eye extends toward his brother’s ewe: ﴿Indeed, this is my brother; he has ninety-nine ewes, while I have one ewe, and he said, “Give it to me,” and he prevailed over me in speech﴾ “Surah Sad: 23”. Here lies the paradox: greed does not begin with a lack of possessions, but with the inability of abundance to satisfy the appetite for ownership, until what belongs to another becomes the objective, and greed becomes a project of influence and control.

The significance of the image lies not in the number of ewes, but in the meaning and idea: how can the desire for ownership exceed the boundaries of need and entitlement? After many centuries, the things over which human beings compete have changed, but the idea has not. The “ewe” is no longer necessarily livestock; it may become political power, an economic resource, a port, influence, or a strategic position. The tools have changed and ambitions have shifted, but the appetite for appropriation has remained the same, merely wearing new clothes.

In the Sudanese context, the “hundredth ewe” can be reduced to one meaning: absolute appropriation without entitlement. Here begins the story of our article with the contemporary Sudanese phenomenon. The war that erupted on April 15 was not merely a struggle over who possesses power or weapons, or who wins, but revealed dimensions larger than that, concerning those who seek to possess the state itself.

Internally, power appears to be the “hundredth ewe.” There are those who seek to reach it at any cost, even at the expense of people’s lives and security, without constitutional entitlement. There are also those who believe that weapons, influence, or political history are sufficient to grant them a permanent right to control and make decisions.

On the other hand, the national role of the army in protecting the state may, under the pressure of war, turn into a justification for political expansion. Here, a distinction must be made between the legitimacy of protecting the state and the legitimacy of ruling it. The army is a national institution, but protecting the state does not mean possessing it, just as force does not grant a permanent political mandate. Likewise, political forces do not possess power without popular mandate, nor can armed movements, regardless of their gains, take a shortcut to power through weapons.

The problem, therefore, is not participation, but its transformation into appropriation; not power, but its transformation into monopoly; and not security, but when security becomes a permanent pretext for confiscating politics. The state is not a “prize,” but a national contract in which powers are distributed according to the constitution and the will of the people.

But the “hundredth ewe” does not stop at the borders of the country’s interior. Our country is rich in ways that make it an object of desire: agricultural land, fresh water, gold, livestock and mineral wealth, and an exceptional position on the Red Sea, in addition to a geography linking the Nile Valley, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel. These are not merely resources; they are elements of power in the balance of geopolitics, influence, and control.

Hence, the question should not be: Who stands with our country and who opposes it? Rather: What does the one who stands with us want? And what does the one who opposes us want?

In politics, there is no ally without an interest. But interest is not necessarily greed, just as every cooperation does not mean conspiracy. The danger begins when an interest exceeds the boundaries of partnership and turns into dictates, or when dictates turn into guardianship.

 Therefore, a smart state does not ask: Who is with us? Rather, it asks: What does he want from us? What do we want from him? And what is the alternative if we disagree?

Here lies one of our political problems: elites have often dealt with foreign relations through the logic of alignment, while the state needs to move toward the logic of interests. Therefore, our country today does not need to choose one axis against another, but rather balanced interests that make its position and resources sources of strength, not doors to guardianship.

Ports are not merely berths, gold is not merely a mineral, water is not merely a natural resource, and agricultural land is not merely an investment. At a moment of international conflict, all of them become instruments of influence. Therefore, wealth that is not protected by the state may turn from a source of strength into a source of attraction for those who covet it.

The war has clearly revealed that this is not merely an internal conflict, amid reports of external support, weapons, financing networks, and the trade in gold and resources. Volker Türk’s characterization of the war as being fought by proxy out of greed for the country’s resources also raises an important question: Who is fighting? Who benefits from the continuation of the war? Who has the capacity to prolong it, and what do they want from it?

Here the matter becomes more complicated. Some regional powers with substantial resources may have interests in Sudan’s resources not because of need, but because of influence, securing future interests, and possessing instruments of power. Greed is not always governed by need. What the covetous party seeks may not be gold itself, but the power gold provides; not the port itself, but the influence granted by its location.

In our neighborhood, geography intersects with the calculations of war. In the Blue Nile and Darfur, the interests of Ethiopia and Chad overlap, while the calculations of the UAE, according to Sudanese allegations and international reports, appear to extend beyond ports to engineering the political landscape in a way that creates influence over the country and an army aligned with its regional project. Amid reports of weapons and movements across borders, the war is thus moving beyond an internal conflict to become an arena where geography intersects with regional ambitions.

Here, the danger does not lie solely in the ambitions of external actors, but also in the ability of the interior to become a gateway for them. Geography demands caution, and prolonged war opens avenues that are difficult to close. More dangerously, internal ambitions and dependence on external actors turn these avenues into instruments of influence; a state is penetrated when its own interior opens its doors.

Therefore, our country’s strategic interest today must begin with defining what is non-negotiable: the unity of the state, its sovereignty, its monopoly over arms, the security of its resources and water, the independence of its decisions, and the protection of its position on the Red Sea. After that comes what can be negotiated according to international norms, including investments, economic and security partnerships, ports, and maritime corridors.

Managing this mosaic and the complexity of the regional and international landscape cannot be achieved through hostility or dependence, but through diversified and balanced partnerships. A state that possesses alternatives negotiates from a position of greater strength, while one that limits its options turns its partnerships into dependency. What is required is for the interests of others to pass through our national interest: investment without diminishing sovereignty, partnership without guardianship, a port without geopolitical mortgaging, land without compromising food security, and water without compromising water security.

From here, the value of Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue goes beyond ending the war and sharing power, toward redefining the national interest and national security.

 Sudanese may disagree over the form of government, the role of the army, and the distribution of power, but they should agree on the fundamentals: sovereignty is not a prize, resources are not a cake, and national security is not a bargaining chip in the calculations of external actors.

The ewes have changed throughout history, and so have the tools of appropriation. But the idea has remained the same: that someone wants more than they are entitled to.

We must realize, according to #TheTruthPerspective, that the “hundredth ewe” is neither gold, nor a port, nor land, but the moment when ambition turns into appropriation, and interest into influence. The danger is not in the greed of others, but in our being preoccupied with fighting over one ewe while others covet the entire flock. Therefore, protecting our country begins with a national will that knows the value of what it possesses, makes national interests the standard for every partnership, and regards sovereignty as a line that cannot be negotiated. For a state that knows the value of its wealth and resources becomes a prize in the calculations of others.

May you remain well and in good health.

Saturday, August 15, 2026

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