Truth Perspective | Ibrahim Shaglawi Ethiopia.. The Dilemma of Backfiring Calculations

In our previous article, titled “Ethiopia.. Security and Political Calculations,” we said that Ethiopia has become a direct part of Sudan’s security equation, and that Khartoum does not seek confrontation with Addis Ababa, but will not accept having the war against it managed from its neighborhood. Today, the equation appears to have taken a more complicated direction.

 While internal divisions within Ethiopia are widening and tensions are resurfacing in Tigray, Amhara, Afar and other regions, Addis Ababa’s calculations regarding the Sudanese war are also coming into focus, raising the question of whether external bets have begun to rebound on its internal security.

The announcement by seven armed Ethiopian groups, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and Fano forces, of forming an alliance targeting the government does not mean that Ethiopia is heading toward collapse or civil war, but it reveals a security and political environment open to multiple possibilities.

More importantly, some of these forces had been fighting each other during the Tigray War before being brought together today by their confrontation with the central government. These developments cannot be separated from the regional environment in which Ethiopia operates, given the intersection of domestic crises with neighboring conflicts and the interests and influence of external powers.

Here, Sudan returns to the heart of the equation. Reports that Ethiopian territory has been used to train or support elements affiliated with the Rapid Support Forces should not be read merely as another card in the Sudanese war.

A state that allows its borders to become a space for the movement, training or support of an armed force fighting a neighboring state is, in practice, entering a security equation whose direction it may not be able to control. Borders do not always recognize function, and armed groups do not necessarily abide by the borders within which they operate.

It is precisely here that the “dilemma of backfiring calculations” emerges. Weakening Sudan may appear, in the short term, to be a means of strengthening Ethiopia’s influence or altering the balance of power, but Sudan is not the weakest link in this equation. Khartoum itself possesses political, security, economic and geographic cards, and can rearrange its regional and international relations in ways that alter the environment in which Addis Ababa operates.

The issue, therefore, is not that Sudan needs Ethiopia more than Ethiopia needs Sudan, or vice versa. This is a superficial reading of the relationship. The reality is that both countries possess leverage and interests, and tampering with one can turn cooperation into pressure.

The Blue Nile also falls within this equation. Ethiopia cannot view its water security in isolation from Sudan, nor separate its internal developments from the stability of its surroundings.

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, regardless of its importance, cannot provide sustainable security if managed through a logic of force. The waters that connect the two countries can become a source of tension, or, through cooperation and investment, be transformed into a shared interest and a source of regional stability.

Then comes trade and economic geography. Ethiopia is a large landlocked country, while Sudan has a Red Sea coastline and Port Sudan, which represents an important outlet for Ethiopian trade and supplies. This is not a Sudanese advantage that should be viewed as a service provided by Khartoum to Addis Ababa, but rather a geographic and economic leverage that makes stable relations between the two countries a shared interest, while making poor management of that relationship costly. Here, the message to Addis Ababa should be clear: do not test the limits of Sudan’s ability to protect its interests.

Khartoum is not seeking confrontation with Ethiopia, but it will also not accept Ethiopian territory becoming a platform for prolonging the Sudanese war or supporting the rebellious militia and its backers. If Ethiopia is reassessing its calculations in the face of growing pressures within its borders, the logic of the state requires it to reduce sources of tension along its borders, not add a Sudanese issue capable of escalation.

It is a strategic mistake for a state to bet on an armed force in a neighboring country while itself facing internal security complexities, because the functions of the tools of war can change, and their repercussions may cross borders in directions that were not anticipated.

Sudan, for its part, does not need to manage its relationship with Ethiopia through the logic of rupture, but through clear interests and mutual respect. The doors of cooperation in water, trade, energy and border affairs should remain open, but this does not mean leniency regarding matters affecting national security. Mutual respect is not confrontation, just as cooperation is not subordination.

Wisdom requires Addis Ababa to realize that Sudan can influence its internal equations, just as Ethiopia can influence some Sudanese issues. Therefore, attempting to pressure Khartoum through militias or war may open doors for Addis Ababa to pressure across numerous issues or regional relations.

This is not a call to use these issues for pressure or blackmail; quite the opposite. It is a call to recognize their danger before they turn into tools of confrontation. Rational states do not wait until they use their leverage to realize its value; rather, they manage it in ways that prevent reaching that stage.

The Horn of Africa cannot tolerate more conflicts or a policy of turning neighboring countries into arenas of influence. The more internal wars become intertwined with interstate conflicts, the harder it becomes to know where state influence ends and the danger of militias begins. What may appear to be a tactical gain today may turn tomorrow into a strategic burden.

Therefore, according to #Truth_Perspective, weakening Sudan is not a guarantee of Ethiopia’s security, but a gamble that may backfire. Khartoum does not seek conflict, but it possesses deterrent and influential cards that make targeting it costly, and it will not accept having the war against it managed from its neighborhood. Sudan is not the weakest link, and the balance of leverage between the two countries is reciprocal. What may appear to be a tactical gain for Ethiopia today may turn tomorrow into a strategic dilemma for Ethiopia.

Wishing you continued health and well-being.

Saturday, September 26, 2026. Shglawi55@gmail.com