The Truth Behind the Headlines | Dr. Ibrahim Shaqlawi Sudan… The War of Targeting and Netanyahu’s Maps

Sudan’s existential battle did not begin on April 15, 2023, nor did Benjamin Netanyahu’s map emerge in October 2026. Behind the current war lies a long history of internal conflicts, external pressures, and competition over resources and strategic location. Between the secession of the South, American sanctions, the faltering political transition, and the outbreak of war, the features of an old yet recurring crisis are taking shape, confronting the country with a question that goes beyond who governs to who controls the decision over its future.

Since Operation “Rainfall” in 1997 during the war in the South, and the external support for the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement led by John Garang associated with that period, through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the secession of South Sudan in 2011, Sudan has continued to face a complex intertwining of its internal crises and the ambitions of external powers.

Then came unilateral American sanctions and the confrontation between the Salvation regime and the International Criminal Court, beginning in 2009, adding political and economic pressures to the crisis of governance. In December 2018, the popular revolution erupted, overthrowing Bashir’s regime in April 2019, before the political transition turned into a disgraceful arena of conflict over the legitimacy of power and the nature of the state and its institutions.

In this context, the 2022 Lawyers’ Draft Constitution, prepared outside the country, followed by the Framework Agreement signed in December of the same year, sparked major disagreements over transitional arrangements, the distribution of power, and the position of the military institution. This phase can be read as an attempt to reshape governance through a settlement that lacked national consensus, given that all its stages formed part of a carefully orchestrated external plan. However, the most dangerous development was the coup attempt by the Rapid Support Forces on April 15, 2023, when the project of seizing control reached maturity. The army thwarted it, and it turned into a war that threatened the country’s unity and opened the door to regional and international interventions.

The significance of Netanyahu’s map, which he presented on October 18, 2026, lies in placing the Rapid Support Forces within an alliance circle comprising Israel and the United Arab Emirates, while placing Sudan within a circle comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan.

The plan raises a strategic question: Why are the Sudanese state and the rebel force—the Rapid Support Forces militia fighting it—placed within two different regional circles? Have the objectives of the war now been exposed, paving the way for a new transition in light of the competition over the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, and strategic resources?

Here, the statements of Volker Türk, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, acquire significance. He described the war as “a proxy battle being fought out of greed for the country’s resources,” linking its continuation to the logic of profit for those waging it and benefiting from it. In his UN briefings, following his visit to Sudan and his meeting with displaced people at Al-Afad camp in the Northern State, he also addressed the exploitation of resources such as gold, livestock, and gum arabic to finance the war, as well as the role of external regional actors providing weapons, funding, and mercenaries. Thus, competition over resources and influence becomes a key part of explaining the continuation of the war.

The essence of the danger lies not in Netanyahu’s map alone, but in the possibility that state weakness could become an opportunity to redistribute influence over Sudanese territory and resources. Sudan possesses a strategic maritime location and agricultural, livestock, and mineral wealth, in addition to its importance in the equations of water and food security. When institutions weaken, these advantages are transformed from instruments of development into incentives for competition and depletion. Therefore, the thesis of historical targeting deserves scrutiny by tracing interests, supply and funding networks, and political connections.

In this context, the “No to War” slogan cannot be separated from the political battle over the war’s outcomes and the balance of power between the army and the Rapid Support Forces.

The slogan carries a legitimate humanitarian dimension in confronting the tragedy. However, its political use, according to a critical reading, shifted part of the debate away from the responsibility of the rebellion and the prospects for ending it toward calls for a cessation of fighting, without clearly resolving the question of restoring the state’s control. Here, the question arises: Was the objective to end the war in a way that dismantles its causes, or to reach a settlement that preserves the Rapid Support Forces as an influential force in the equation of power and authority, allowing the crisis to be reproduced through new instruments?

This question gains particular significance from the signing of the Addis Ababa Declaration on January 2, 2024, by Dr. Abdalla Hamdok, then head of the Taqaddum Coordination, and Rapid Support Forces commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. The declaration addressed the cessation of hostilities and the protection of civilians, and touched on restructuring the security sector toward the establishment of a national army.

However, signing it with the leader of the rebel force, while the war was ongoing, gave the Rapid Support Forces a political platform to negotiate the future of the state. From a political perspective, this can be read as a potential entry point for reintegrating the militia into the political equation before resolving the consequences of its rebellion and violations. Was the political track deliberately intended to open a window for rehabilitating the militia within the declared regional equation?

What is required today, according to #TheTruthBehindTheHeadlines, is to move from reaction to building a strategic assessment that exposes supply and funding networks, employs evidence diplomatically and legally, protects the domestic front, and rebuilds state institutions.

Reclaiming territory is incomplete without regaining control over decision-making and resources. The battle is not new. It is a battle over state sovereignty, and therefore Sudan’s wealth and strategic position must not be held hostage to the calculations of others. Sudan is not an empty space on their maps, nor is its sovereignty a bargaining chip. Any peace that fails to safeguard the unity of the state and its people’s right to their resources and their own decisions is nothing more than a truce that postpones the war and brings the declared maps to fruition.

Wishing you continued well-being and good health.

Sunday, October 25, 2026

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