The Truth of the Matter | Dr. Ibrahim Shaqlawi Ethiopian Dams and Sudan’s Water Security
On Friday, October 23, 2026, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed inaugurated the “Megetch” irrigation dam in the city of Gondar, with a storage capacity of 185 million cubic meters, to provide irrigation water for more than 17,000 hectares of agricultural land, according to Ethiopian media. Although the dam’s direct impact on the flow of the Blue Nile into Sudan is limited, its strategic significance lies in the broader context of Ethiopia’s expanding dam projects, amid the absence of a binding framework governing shared water management and safeguarding the interests of downstream countries.
In March 2026, Addis Ababa announced plans to develop three additional hydropower dams on the Blue Nile: Karadobi, Mendaya, and Beko Abo, with a combined generating capacity of approximately 5,700 megawatts. Although these projects remain in the planning and preparation stages, they indicate a strategic Ethiopian direction that goes beyond the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam toward reshaping the water and energy system in the upper Blue Nile basin. Sudan should therefore interpret this development as a gradual transformation in control over water resources. The actual impact is not determined by the size of each dam individually, but by the combined effect of all dams, their storage capacities, filling and operating rules, and the degree of coordination among the basin countries.
Accuracy requires distinguishing between the Megetch Dam, which lies outside the main course of the Blue Nile, and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the proposed projects on it. There is insufficient information to consider Megetch a direct threat to Sudan’s water security. However, ignoring its significance within Ethiopia’s broader expansion trajectory would deprive Sudan of an opportunity to prepare early for forthcoming changes. The problem does not lie in Ethiopia’s right to development, but in the possibility that operational control over upstream facilities could become an established reality affecting Sudan without adequate participation in determining the rules governing it.
Sudanese water experts offer differing assessments. Some believe that managing dams within an integrated system could regulate seasonal flows, reduce flooding, and improve the operation of the Roseires and Sennar dams, while others warn of the risks arising from a lack of transparency and data exchange. Both perspectives converge on an important reality: dams can serve as instruments of shared development or sources of risk, depending on how they are managed. For Sudan, the proximity of Roseires Dam to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam makes accurate information and coordination on water releases, operations, and emergencies directly relevant to the safety of water infrastructure, agricultural stability, and flood management.
Sudan has a technical agreement with Ethiopia, signed in Khartoum in October 2022. Current developments call for reviewing its implementation status and working to activate its committees and coordination and data-sharing arrangements. This would strengthen operational coordination between the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and Roseires Dam and improve preparedness for droughts and floods. The strategic value of any understanding lies not in signing it, but in translating it into a practical programme that can be measured and monitored.
Politically, Sudan cannot protect its interests merely by reacting to developments or waiting for Ethiopia’s projects to be completed. What is needed today is a proactive water strategy combining early monitoring, cumulative assessments of existing and planned dams, the development of warning systems, and the strengthening of technical and negotiating capacities.
Sudan’s position should also be grounded in the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization of water and cooperation to prevent significant harm, without denying Ethiopia’s right to development or accepting unilateral measures that impose operating rules independently.
However, what lies beyond Ethiopia’s dams may, according to experts, represent a gradual shift in the balance of control over Blue Nile waters, particularly in light of previous statements by the relevant minister. Under this shift, storage and operational capacities are advancing faster than the establishment of clear regional coordination rules. Sudan therefore faces a delicate equation: it cannot afford to oppose Ethiopian development, nor can it allow its water security to remain hostage to unilateral decisions or delayed information. Good neighbourly relations are not measured by intentions, but by the clarity of operating rules, data exchange, and preparedness for droughts and floods. The question is not how many dams Ethiopia will build, but whether Sudan possesses the knowledge, institutions, and tools to protect its interests before changes in water dynamics become an established reality.
According to #The_Truth_of_the_Matter, the strategic question is not whether the Megetch Dam threatens Sudan, but whether Sudan has an integrated vision for addressing the accelerating transformations in Blue Nile management. The expansion of dams may create opportunities for integration in energy and agriculture, but it may also redistribute risks and influence if coordination is absent. Accordingly, protecting Sudan’s water security begins with moving beyond monitoring individual projects toward managing the Nile file as an issue of sovereignty, national security, development, and regional stability, and treating existing understandings as practical instruments for protecting national interests rather than merely postponed agreements.
Wishing you continued well-being and good health.
Monday, October 26, 2026
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