The Face of Truth | Dr. Ibrahim Shaglawi Drones… Security and Political Calculations

It is clear that drone attacks targeting vital facilities across the country have opened the door to a broader analysis concerning Sudan’s position in regional security equations, the future of the Red Sea, and international competition for influence in the Horn of Africa. Targeting power stations, from Sennar, Al-Faw, and Al-Hawata to Umm Dabaker and Al-Markhiyat in Omdurman, goes beyond inflicting damage on infrastructure. Its impact extends to undermining the state’s ability to restore its functions, slowing recovery, and keeping society under the pressure of war.

On Thursday, Prime Minister Kamil Idris visited Al-Markhiyat power station to assess the extent of the damage and the efforts to repair it. This visit carries important significance, given that restoring electricity means restoring life to hospitals, water stations, markets, and sources of production. Therefore, targeting the national grid does not merely cut power; it disrupts people’s lives, increases the state’s burdens, and delays its transition from managing the war to development and reconstruction.

However, the picture cannot be fully understood within these limits. The escalation of drone attacks coincides with attempts to impose an arms and flight ban across the entire country, raising concerns that military pressure may be used to impose a new reality that could lead to a truce restricting the state’s capabilities and giving the militia an opportunity to catch its breath and reorganize its ranks. This does not necessarily establish coordination between the two tracks, but previous experiences reveal that truces not linked to ending the rebellion may become a pause for reproducing the war. Here lies the core dilemma: international pressure may shift from a means of ending the war to managing its balances.

The significance of the situation becomes broader when viewed in light of what took place in Moscow during the Third Russia-Africa Summit. President Abdel Fattah al-Burhan affirmed Sudan’s aspiration to develop its relations with Russia across various fields, drawing on a diplomatic history spanning seventy years and commending Moscow’s positions in support of Sudan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. He also presented a vision based on a multipolar world, rejecting foreign interference, and building partnerships that serve mutual interests.

This direction cannot be separated from Sudan’s need to diversify its military and economic partnerships, particularly amid the war and the declining effectiveness of some international avenues. For Khartoum, Moscow represents a potential partner in arms, energy, mining, and infrastructure, in addition to its diplomatic presence on the UN Security Council. The discussion surrounding the Russian base in Port Sudan also brings back to the forefront the question of how to benefit from Sudan’s strategic position on the Red Sea. However, according to Russian statements published in November 2025, this issue remained frozen and had not developed into an actual military presence.

Here, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s statements at the same summit acquire a political significance worthy of reflection. Cairo declared its rejection of exploiting the fragile situation in the Horn of Africa to militarize the Red Sea or impose a military presence along its shores by countries that do not border it. This came alongside his reaffirmation of Egypt’s rejection of any threat to Sudan’s unity, sovereignty, and national institutions, and his call to end the war through an exclusively Sudanese dialogue.

The Egyptian position should not be interpreted as opposition to Sudan’s stability or its right to diversify its relations. Sudan represents Egypt’s strategic and security depth, and its stability is linked to Egypt’s border security, Nile waters, and regional balances.

Yet politics is governed by interests, not emotions. Cairo, which maintains a broad strategic partnership with Moscow, also understands that Russian cooperation with Sudan evolving into security arrangements through a military base on the Red Sea coast could alter the calculations of influence and security balances in the region.

From this perspective, Sisi’s statement can be understood as a potential political message to Moscow and Khartoum: welcoming economic and diplomatic partnerships does not necessarily mean accepting a new military expansion in the Red Sea. This equation reveals that Egypt wants a stable Sudan, while also monitoring the nature of the alliances that may form around it and the potential impact on its regional interests.

This does not prove that the statement was directed at the potential Sudanese-Russian agreement, but it makes linking its timing to the geopolitical context a reading worthy of discussion.

Alongside being an international trade route, the Red Sea has become an arena where the calculations of major powers and coastal states intersect, from port security and energy routes to military bases and spheres of influence. Sudan, with its coastline and geographical position, is not far removed from this equation. Therefore, weakening its institutions and depleting its infrastructure creates a dangerous vacuum whose consequences extend beyond its borders.

From the perspective of #TheFaceOfTruth, Sudan should not be pushed into choosing between Cairo and Moscow, nor should it replace one set of external pressures with another. It has the right to diversify its partnerships, develop its defense and economic capabilities, and leverage its strategic position to build balanced relations. However, this requires a national vision that defines what Sudan wants from its allies, what it can offer, and what must never be compromised.

Wishing you continued well-being.

Saturday, October 31, 2026

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