The Truth Perspective | Ibrahim Shaglawi Ethiopia… The Calculations of Security and Politics

Ethiopia has become a direct part of the equation of Sudan’s security and the future of its war. What is happening on the eastern border these days, in the Blue Nile, goes beyond the war itself to military and political transformations with regional dimensions. In this article, we attempt to read the implications of these transformations, Ethiopia’s political and security calculations, and the possibility of its being subject to regional agendas that intersect with the course of the war and its outcomes.

On the ground, the Rapid Support Forces militia is facing significant pressure as a result of its defeats in Kordofan, its declining ability to maneuver, growing internal divisions, and the erosion of its morale and the effectiveness of foreign mercenaries, alongside mounting pressure on its allies in the mountains. Moreover, the Sudanese Army’s recent control of the border triangle has closed one of its supply routes and increased the cost of its continued fighting in the west.

Here, the army’s management of the war appears more important than merely recording victories. The equation has come to rest on cutting supply arteries, isolating areas of operation, exhausting the capacity of the rebellion, and then advancing where the cost of battle is lower and the strategic return is greater. This makes the prospect of liberating what remains of Kordofan and then moving toward Darfur a potential reality if the process of dismantling supply lines continues with efficiency and effectiveness.

Therefore, shifting pressure toward the Blue Nile and the eastern border may be an attempt to disperse the army’s strength and disrupt its advance by forcing it to distribute its forces across more than one front. Here, Ethiopia becomes part of the strategic calculation, as the eastern front is connected to its geographic depth, the Blue Nile, and the balances of the Horn of Africa, making any instability there a potential tool for rebalancing power.

Therefore, it is a political mistake for Khartoum to view Addis Ababa as a single bloc, just as it is a mistake for Addis Ababa to view Sudan as a state exhausted by war and deprived of its tools of influence and maneuver. Sudan knows Ethiopia through deep historical knowledge, by virtue of geographical proximity and social, economic, political, and security interconnections, as well as its longstanding relations with its various components.

To confirm this, history, with its present-day backgrounds, compels us to understand the context. Sudan was, at previous stages, part of the regional environment that contributed to changing the Ethiopian regime and the fall of Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991, whose era was associated with supporting the southern war and backing the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement led by John Garang. This fact does not mean that Sudan can reproduce those balances, but it confirms that Khartoum possesses experience in reading Ethiopia’s internal environment and has a network of knowledge and relationships that gives it greater capacity to influence the Ethiopian interior.

Sudan does not want to use its knowledge against Ethiopia, but it will not accept Ethiopia violating its territory by supporting the rebellion, and this is the essence of the message. Despite the war, Khartoum has kept the door of communication open, welcoming the Ethiopian Prime Minister’s visit and his mediation to end the war, moving beyond previous tensions, including Addis Ababa’s call for African intervention through “ISAF.” It also welcomed Ethiopia’s readiness to mediate with Abu Dhabi to bring the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, together with its leadership.

This is not diplomacy, but political cards confirming that Khartoum has not closed the door to Addis Ababa. However, openness is not naivety, and tolerance does not mean the absence of calculations. If Ethiopia is looking at its national security, it should ask itself: Does a troubled Sudan on its borders serve its interests? Sudan’s stability means secure borders, regular trade, and control over the movement of people and weapons, while the continuation of the war could turn it into a direct threat to Ethiopia itself. Therefore, its strategic interest should not be measured by the gains of today’s allies, but by what the map of Sudan will become tomorrow.

The scene becomes even more sensitive as the Nile enters the geopolitical calculations, as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is part of the equation of influence in the Nile Basin. Despite the existence of a technical agreement between Sudan and Ethiopia to exchange information on the dam’s flows on October 22, 2022, any move to turn water into a tool of political pressure threatens this cooperation. Therefore, Sudan needs a balanced policy: neither threats nor pleading, but protection of its water interests, consolidation of technical cooperation, and linking Sudan’s stability to the interests of both countries without politicization.

Here, the “rearrangement of the cards” goes beyond Sudan to Ethiopia itself. It is in Ethiopia’s interest not to allow its influence and position to be turned into tools in regional conflicts or international ambitions. Sudan’s stability is not a Sudanese interest alone, just as weakening it for the benefit of other powers could open doors for Ethiopia today that may be difficult to close tomorrow. Therefore, the independence of Ethiopian decision-making begins with rejecting the transformation of Sudan’s borders or crisis into an arena for settling others’ scores. States do not protect their security by expanding the influence of others, but by safeguarding their decisions and building a stable and balanced neighborhood.

According to #TheTruthPerspective, Sudan does not want to antagonize Ethiopia; rather, it wants Ethiopia to reconsider its calculations. Khartoum is neither weak nor begging, and if Ethiopia has its alliances, Sudan also has its allies, interests, and cards. More importantly, Ethiopia’s security cannot be built on weakening Sudan, but on a stable and balanced neighborhood. Therefore, Addis Ababa must shield its decision-making from regional and international influence and realize that Sudan is not seeking war, but it will not accept having the war against it managed from its neighborhood. These are the calculations of security and politics that Ethiopia should understand.

Wishing you continued health and well-being.

Monday, August 31, 2026

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