The Face of Truth | Ibrahim Shaglawi Sudan’s Dilemma… Between War and Dialogue

Sudan’s crisis today is not between those who want war and those who want dialogue, but rather over who controls the conditions for moving from the battlefield to politics, when that should happen, and under what balance? In this article, we attempt to examine this equation and what it conceals of a struggle over the conditions for ending the war and the future of the state.

This is the equation from which thinking about the future of both war and dialogue should begin. War is not merely a gun on the battlefield, and dialogue is not merely a table around which politicians sit. Both are part of a broader struggle in which military power, the economy, diplomacy, regional and international interests, and the ability to influence the future of the Sudanese state all intersect.

Therefore, opening the door to dialogue does not mean relaxing the protection of the state, just as continuing military operations does not mean closing the door to politics. The mistake is to place the two tracks in opposition to each other, whereas the reality is that vigilance and mobilization to protect the state determine the conditions of dialogue, while responsible dialogue protects what the state achieves on the battlefield.

The picture becomes clearer in the latest report of the UN Security Council Panel of Experts, prepared pursuant to Resolution 2791 in September 2025, which documented cross-border networks for recruiting and training personnel and transferring weapons, drones, and logistical support to the Rapid Support Forces, including links to Colombian fighters and networks based in the UAE. With the UN Fact-Finding Mission calling for the arms embargo to be expanded from Darfur to the whole of Sudan, and Washington proposing a draft in the same direction, external military support has become not merely an allegation, but rather a UN-documented file, with growing legal, diplomatic, and moral implications, after the report concluded that it contributed to strengthening military capabilities and prolonging the war.

Here, political analysis should pause for a long time before this recommendation. If the objective is to stop the flow of weapons that prolongs the war, then extending the embargo to the entire country, without distinguishing between the armed forces of the state and the militia in rebellion against it, raises a highly sensitive and complex political and legal issue. Under the standards of the state, law, and ethics, the national army responsible for protecting the country and its institutions cannot be equated with an armed formation in rebellion outside its legitimate structure.

This equation may be understood as an unfair equivalence between the state and the militia, particularly given the latter’s continued military decline. The militia is a force in rebellion against the state, not a political faction equal to it. Therefore, any international measure should not restrict the army’s ability to restore the country’s sovereignty and protect civilians, or give the rebellion an opportunity to reposition itself. Dialogue is opened to political and societal forces, whereas weapons do not create a political right for the rebel, nor grant it a place in determining Sudan’s future.

The paradox is that any embargo that fails to take the nature of the conflict into account may not end the war, but instead freeze it at a “balance of weakness” that gives the militia room to reposition itself. In such circumstances, it may seek to create a surprise by taking control of a governing region or one of strategic importance, thereby disrupting the scene and reshuffling the cards.

From here, the “balance of weakness” takes shape as an intersection of interests that prolongs the war, foremost among them regional support that provides the militia with weapons and funding, in addition to international pressures that may push toward a cessation of fighting before the crisis is addressed. Thus, preventing defeat may become an objective in itself until the balance changes. Consequently, maintaining the battlefield initiative is important, not as a rejection of dialogue, but as a condition for entering it from a position of strength and control, because dialogue that precedes consolidating the state’s ability to protect itself may end in a settlement imposed by the balances of war upon the will of the Sudanese people.

The economic front also comes to the fore, as the currency, prices, liquidity, production, and trade have become part of the battle of resilience. With the erosion of the purchasing power of the national currency and the exhaustion of citizens, the appeal of any settlement that ends the suffering may increase, even if it does not address the crisis, opening the door to a balance of exhaustion.

Accordingly, the resilience of the Sudanese state requires an urgent parallel economic movement: restoring confidence in the currency and banks, stimulating production and exports, curbing speculation and smuggling, and providing foreign currency, while expanding support, investment, and regional and international trade. The economy is not a file to be postponed until after the war; rather, it is a decisive arena in the battle for the survival of the state and its ability to impose its choices.

Abroad, Khartoum needs to move from reactive diplomacy to agenda-setting diplomacy, drawing on the UN report to pursue networks involved in financing, arming, and recruiting, and to hold accountable those who prolong the war. The battle is not about an arms embargo alone, but about drying up its sources, closing the routes used to circumvent it, and identifying those behind it. There is no meaning in stopping the war while its mechanisms remain active. Peace begins by silencing the guns, but it is not complete until its sources are dried up.

Internally, Sudanese dialogue should move toward rebuilding the state, not redistributing power among the elites: a dialogue leading to participation, elections, justice, and reconciliation, rather than a temporary settlement that reproduces the crisis. It should not be an alternative to the balances of power, just as decisive action must not become an alternative to politics.

According to #The_Face_of_Truth, the equation can be summed up in an important rule: weapons belong to the state, politics belongs to dialogue and elections, crimes belong to justice, and the decision belongs to the people. Here lies Sudan’s dilemma between dialogue and war: military decisiveness prevents the rebellion from imposing its reality, diplomacy dries up its sources of arms, and dialogue opens the path to the future without granting weapons the right to shape it. The issue is not how the war ends, but under what conditions it ends, and who will preserve Sudan’s right to write what comes after it.

Wishing you continued health and well-being.

Monday, September 7, 2026

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