The Face of Truth | Ibrahim Shaglawi Sudan: A State or a Spoil?

Our Sudanese crisis has remained a reproduction of old schemes, where ambitions and aggression against our country are repeated, as happened during the South war between 1983 and 2005, when the United States of America supported military operations through Uganda and Ethiopia. Today, history repeats itself, but with modern methods: external support for rebellion, ambitions of neighboring countries, and conflicts over vital resources—making the country’s ability to protect its sovereignty tied to the effectiveness of the state and the internal front.

What is happening in Sudan reflects a qualitative shift in patterns of conflict. External intervention is no longer direct in the traditional sense; rather, it is now managed through complex networks in which roles are distributed among financing, training, and logistical support. In this context, the statements of UAE advisor Dr. Abdulkhaleq Abdullah on the program “What is the Solution?” hosted by Dr. Rabab Elmahdi gain particular significance, as his attempt to deny his country’s unilateral support by pointing to the roles of other regional states.

does not weaken the accusation as much as it reformulates it. Politically, denial turns into an implicit acknowledgment of a multi-party support system, where responsibility is not eliminated but redistributed.

 This pattern of exposed discourse clarifies that the conflict is no longer an internal matter but has become part of a regional network in which war is managed as a tool to reshape balances of influence, and in which the will of the state is tested.

The paradox is that the same international powers, led by the United States of America, rush to restrict popular support for the army under human rights pretexts or allegations of violations, while overlooking documented crimes—according to human rights organizations—committed by the Rapid Support Forces militia in Al Jazirah, Darfur, and Kordofan, as openly indicated by Volker Türk, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

These contradictions reflect the chaos of international law and the collapse of moral and humanitarian values. They also reflect the fragility of Sudanese political parties and the inability of civilian actors to translate popular support into tangible action, or at least into effective regional and international coordination with the armed forces to protect the .

The Sudanese army and security apparatus are carrying out their duties despite difficulties, but political division exacerbates the state’s crisis. Parties are divided between groups supporting the army without clear effectiveness in mobilizing the masses and employing their bases in the nation’s battle, and others, such as the “Somoud” current, that support the rebellion and justify it under humanitarian slogans, working to weaken rather than strengthen the national spirit.

In contrast, real effectiveness appears in Islamic youth currents and armed struggle movements, where these groups translate their support into the battlefield, embodying that the issue is not platforms for speech, but a matter of existence and national decision.

Today’s war is not only on land, but also along the lines of resources and financing. Gold, strategic minerals, agricultural lands, and water constitute targets for regional and international conflicts. The formal economy has been dismantled and replaced by a parallel war economy, where power is measured by the ability of actors to control resources and monetize them through cross-border networks. The state becomes a formal framework, while real power shifts to those who possess money, weapons, and smuggling networks.

The disengagement of parties and the decline of popular mobilization are a result of the absence of effective political leadership that understands that national mobilization is an existential necessity. The fall of strategic locations such as Al-Kurmuk and the displacement of thousands of families prove that the war threatens the existence of the state, and that any illusion of the conflict’s end weakens morale and strengthens the enemy.

Here, the appearance of party leaders, field leadership of the army, and the Prime Minister and his government on the front lines becomes extremely important to restore confidence in the battle and support the army.

Some optimistic rhetoric has produced a false impression that the battle is nearing its end, leading to a gradual disengagement of society from the state of mobilization. This disconnect between public perception and battlefield reality creates a psychological vacuum that allows the conflict to continue without cohesive resistance.

Wars are not decided only on the frontlines, but also in the awareness of the peoples who fight them. When this awareness weakens, the state’s ability to endure erodes, even if it possesses the tools of combat.

Sudanese political parties, over decades, have squandered the opportunity to build a strong and stable state, whether during the rule of the Salvation regime or after it, due to internal divisions and competition over positions and resources. This has made Sudan hostage to regional and international conflicts and ambitions. The failure was not only the result of sanctions, but of the absence of a clear strategic vision for managing resources and transforming them into a developmental lever—this vacuum was exploited internally and externally, keeping Sudan a target.

The Sudanese crisis today is a crisis of the state. A state that has begun to withdraw from its battle, unable to impose its sovereignty, while international and regional ambitions intersect over its wealth. External intervention here is not an exception, but a natural result of state fragility. Sudan today is fragile enough to be devoured, and any future stability or development is contingent upon the state’s ability to restore its sovereignty and unify its internal front.

Ambitions in Sudan are renewed whenever its internal weakness is renewed, as the abundance of its resources is coupled with the absence of a state capable of managing them efficiently. Breaking this pattern does not come through slogans, but through rebuilding the state on foundations that make resource management the basis of national sovereignty.

The battle is not decided by possession of weapons alone, but by the ability to transform wealth into an effective national power in the face of ambitions.

Within this framework, according to #Face_of_Truth, supporting the army and development becomes an action of importance, not merely a program: raising mobilization, organizing the mining sector, stopping smuggling, developing agriculture, building infrastructure that connects the peripheries to the center and prevents the margins from turning into zones of external influence, and directing energy and petroleum investments toward a real productive economy.

This, alongside a comprehensive national project that reshapes the relationship between the state, wealth, and society, can transform resources from a curse that invites ambitions into a القوة that protects Sudan and breaks the cycle that has made it, whenever it weakens, closer to a spoil than a state.

Wishing you continued health and well-being.

Wednesday, April 1, 2026

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