Truth Lens | Ibrahim Shaglawi El Obeid Between Siege and Blackmail

In political literature, wars are not decided solely by control over geography; they also extend into the realm of willpower and consciousness. Therefore, the challenges facing the city of El Obeid today go beyond its local boundaries into security, political, and psychological dimensions, requiring our country to exercise a greater degree of vigilance, caution, and national cohesion.

The day before yesterday, Commander of the Ground Forces Lieutenant General Malik Al-Tayeb Khogali affirmed that military operations are advancing toward reclaiming the remaining areas under militia control, and that the liberation of Babanusa, Zalingei, and El Daein has become an achievable objective in the near future. At the same time, international warnings intensified regarding a potential attack on the city of El Obeid, amid UN calls to avoid a repetition of what occurred in El Fasher.

Between these two developments, a broad debate emerged within Sudan and among politicians regarding the nature of these warnings and their true objectives.

There is no doubt that the government and its security and military institutions do not treat international warnings lightly, as these institutions rely on extensive monitoring and intelligence systems. However, a large segment of Sudanese citizens no longer views such statements and warnings as neutral messages; rather, they interpret them within the context of a long history of international contradictions that have accompanied the war.

The question being asked today is not why the United Nations is warning about El Obeid, but why the international community failed to prevent the tragedies it had previously warned about in El Fasher. Why do some international actors appear highly concerned with issuing statements of alarm, while their effectiveness declines and they refrain from taking clear positions when it comes to holding the militia accountable for the widespread violations it has continued to commit against civilians?

This question becomes even more significant when examining what El Obeid itself has witnessed in recent days. The city has been subjected to drone attacks targeting vital civilian and service facilities, including electricity and water installations as well as markets—facilities directly linked to the lives of citizens and the stability of the community.

Many Sudanese therefore ask: If the United Nations fears a humanitarian catastrophe in El Obeid, should its position not be clearer regarding the violations that have already occurred? Is the targeting of civilian infrastructure and service facilities, such as electricity and water installations and markets, not prohibited under the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law, and could it not amount to a war crime requiring more explicit condemnation and more serious demands for accountability?

These questions reflect a crisis of confidence between Sudanese society and international institutions. After years of war, many Sudanese have come to believe that international actors are more concerned with managing and prolonging the crisis than with ending it, and more interested in preserving the balance of conflict than in addressing its root causes. From this perspective, some interpret the recent warnings as part of crude political pressure aimed at pushing the Sudanese government toward negotiating arrangements or humanitarian truces that may contribute to reproducing the crisis rather than resolving it.

However, the more important question is not related to the international warnings themselves, but rather to the reason behind the growing attention to El Obeid at this particular moment. Developments on the ground indicate significant shifts in Kordofan, coinciding with increasing fractures within the militia and the defection of some of its leaders to the side of the state, in addition to the growing voices speaking about the violations suffered by civilians during the war.

In this context, observers do not rule out the possibility that the escalation surrounding El Obeid is part of an attempt to reshape the military landscape in Kordofan and compel the army to distribute its efforts in a way that eases pressure on axes that are more important to the militia, particularly those connected to supply routes toward Darfur. Thus, the battle for El Obeid should not be understood merely as a battle for a city, but as part of a larger struggle over the course of the war.

Nor can the political dimension of this timing be ruled out. When a rebel force faces military pressure or internal instability, it often resorts to creating a major event that reunifies its ranks and diverts attention from its crises. Therefore, part of the media noise surrounding El Obeid may also be linked to an attempt to create a new image for the militia at a moment when questions about its future are increasingly being raised.

At the same time, another narrative is taking shape within the Kordofan scene, speaking of mounting losses within the militia and a decline in its ability to achieve genuine strategic breakthroughs. Whether all or only some of these accounts are accurate, what matters most is that they reveal the existence of a large-scale psychological war.

In this context, according to #Truth_Lens, the militia seeks to exaggerate its ability to threaten El Obeid in order to spread fear and destabilize the internal front, while statements from parties supporting it contribute to achieving the same effect. Herein lies the nature of the battle: modern wars are conducted through influencing public opinion. Therefore, the real challenge does not lie in military threats, but in rumors, intimidation, and conflicting information aimed at exhausting the will of the population and undermining their resilience, making awareness and steadfastness an integral part of the battle to defend the city.

Wishing you continued health and well-being.

Monday, 22 June 2026

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