The Face of Truth | Dr. Ibrahim Shaglawi Sudan… and Kulaib ibn Rabi’a

The phrase used by Ambassador Al-Harith Idris, Sudan’s representative to the United Nations, “no more than the strap of Kulaib’s sandal,” was not merely a sentence recalled from history.

The phrase, with its cultural and popular significance, came in the context of a political confrontation in which Sudan sought to say something greater than merely responding to the representative of the United Arab Emirates or refuting its statement. It sought to reclaim the country’s right to define the war, to determine its context, who stands behind it, and who is attempting to rewrite its narrative before the world.

At the United Nations General Assembly, Al-Harith Idris responded yesterday to the interventions of the United Arab Emirates and Chad, relying on international reports, including the report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission concerning the external factors that fuel and prolong the war.

The report pointed to cross-border networks involved in recruiting, transporting, and training foreign fighters, and in providing weapons and military technologies to the rebel Rapid Support Forces, with individuals and entities within these networks linked to the UAE. According to the findings of investigations and documented facts, which established the UAE’s involvement in supporting the war, despite its continued denial.

 Thus, the matter is no longer merely a political accusation, but a documented legal and ethical file that places responsibility for external support before the regional and international community.

Here an important question arises: Why did Sudan need this response? Because the battle has increasingly been fought over the narrative and sovereignty. In light of the remarks by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk that Sudan’s war is being fought by proxy out of greed for its resources, reducing it to an internal conflict between two sides is not merely an oversimplification, but rather an erasure of the regional context surrounding it. Sudan is not a field open to the ambitions of the ambitious, nor are its resources spoils for allies and proxies. It is the territory of a sovereign state, and its decision, resources, and people’s right to them are not subject to bargaining.

That is why the reference to “Kulaib ibn Rabi’a” was deeper than it may appear. Kulaib is not merely a figure from Arab memory, nor simply a name associated with the Basus War and what it embodies of conflict over dignity, revenge, and power. He remains present in the Arab popular memory as a symbol of a disgraceful conflict that transcended individuals to embody the meaning of the community, dignity, and existence. When the Sudanese diplomat invokes this memory in an international forum, he also invokes a language known to the Arab consciousness, while at the same time addressing an older and deeper Sudanese memory.

Sudan’s history did not begin on April 15, 2023, nor is its identity reduced to the scene of war, nor is its state defined by the modern maps of influence imposed upon it.

Behind Sudan lies an extended history, from Kerma, Kush, Napata, and Meroë, through sultanates, kingdoms, and political entities such as the Funj and Darfur, to the modern Sudanese state. This is not historical ornamentation placed at the beginning of articles, but rather part of the collective consciousness that makes Sudanese people deeply sensitive to any attempt to reduce their country to the image of a troubled state or an open arena for others.

From this perspective, the phrase “no more than the strap of Kulaib’s sandal” appears to say to those who covet Sudan: do not think that the Sudan before you has no memory, and do not treat its people as merely a number in a humanitarian report or as a party to a war whose definition can be rewritten from outside.

The report of the Fact-Finding Mission pointed to the roles of international networks in supporting the parties to the war, and the Mission stated that it had “reasonable grounds to believe” that entities, intermediaries, and networks operating across several countries were involved in providing military and logistical support to the rebel Rapid Support Forces. These facts open a broad political and legal avenue for Khartoum, not merely through making accusations, but by turning them into documented files and specific issues before the regional and international community.

Our country today does not need to repeat who financed and who armed; the matter is already present in international discourse, and UN reports and mechanisms have spoken of external support and cross-border networks fueling the war. What is required is to move the issue from the circle of condemnation to the circle of deterrence: political and legal action, pursuit of financing and arms networks, and mobilizing the region and the international community to stop the intervention.

Sudan is not merely defending its land, resources, and decision; it is affirming that its sovereignty is not a bargaining chip, and that its war cannot become a gateway to dividing a nation or plundering its resources.

This, according to #TheFaceOfTruth, is why the time has come for Sudan to be seen as it wishes: a sovereign state, not a sphere of influence; a homeland with a memory, not a vacuum contested by ambitions. Kulaib ibn Rabi’a remains a symbol of those who refuse to allow their land to be violated, but Sudan is not Kulaib, and its war is not the Basus War. Sudan is a state, not a spoil; its resources are not common property; and its national decision is not a bargaining chip in the calculations of those who covet it. Whoever seeks to write Sudan’s future must understand that this future will be written by Sudanese alone.

Wishing you continued health and well-being

Wednesday, September 30, 2026

Shglawi55@gmail.com