The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam… or Sudan’s Oversight? Face of the Truth | Ibrahim Shaglawi
In our Sunday column, Face of the Truth, titled “Our Water Security… On the Brink of Thirst,” we were not attempting to take sides in the controversy surrounding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Rather, we pointed out that Sudan had already entered a new hydrological phase, and that the real danger lay not in the decline of the Nile’s water level, but in the continued management of the water sector with an outdated mindset. We argued that water security has become a fundamental pillar of national security and national sovereignty.
Only hours later, we received an important contribution from Professor Saif El-Din Hamad, former Chairman of the Technical Committee at the Ministry of Water Resources, which gave this discussion a highly significant scientific dimension. His remarks, carrying precise information and fundamental questions, confirmed that the issue cannot be reduced to the GERD alone, but extends to how Sudan manages its new water reality.
What stands out in the Professor’s remarks is that he did not adopt the accusatory rhetoric many have become accustomed to, nor did he portray the GERD as solely responsible for what has happened. Instead, he redirected the discussion toward Sudan’s internal management. He explained that the Ethiopian dam operates according to a well-known annual schedule, storing water during the flood season between July and October, before releasing it gradually during the dry months. This reality has now become part of the hydrological equation of the Blue Nile Basin.
This raises an important question: if the state already knew in advance when the storage process would begin, why did the situation unfold as though the country had been caught by surprise? States are not judged by their ability to explain crises after they occur, but by their ability to anticipate and prepare for them.
The Professor goes further by emphasizing that the discharges from the GERD between January and the end of June exceeded Sudan’s actual water requirements. Technically, this would have made it possible to store sufficient quantities in the Roseires Dam to secure irrigation needs and electricity generation during the July storage period. This is not merely an operational observation, but a direct question about the efficiency of managing available resources. If the water was available, why was it not managed in a way that ensured water security at the critical moment?
The most significant point in the Professor’s statement remains that Sudan and Ethiopia signed technical arrangements on 26 October 2022 to regulate dam operations and exchange information. This fact, which has been discussed before, redefines the essence of the crisis. The problem was not a lack of information, but rather the failure to utilize it effectively within decision-making institutions. This raises another question: why were the technical coordination mechanisms not activated on a regular basis? Was this due to institutional shortcomings or political calculations? Water security is not managed through an information vacuum, but through a national vision grounded in science and the national interest.
Another equally important question arises: did the joint Sudanese-Ethiopian technical committee continue to perform its role as required? Did it continue to meet regularly to ensure the smooth exchange of information and technical coordination? If the answer is yes, why were those inputs not reflected in Sudan’s reservoir operating policies? And if the answer is no, what prevented the activation of one of the country’s most important water security management mechanisms? These questions are not an attempt to assign blame to any particular party, but rather a call to review the technical coordination system upon which the management of such a strategic resource should be based.
Perhaps the most serious revelation in the Professor’s statement is that Sudan has yet to complete its adaptation to the new reality imposed by the GERD. Continuing to operate the Roseires and Jebel Aulia dams according to the philosophy that existed before the Ethiopian dam means that the crisis does not lie in the emergence of a new variable, but in the slow institutional response to that change. The knowledge was available, national expertise existed, and technical understandings were in place. The missing link that deserves review is how all of this is translated into operational decisions and public policies.
At this point, the issue moves beyond water management to the broader question of state governance. A modern state is not measured merely by the resources it possesses, but by its ability to manage them efficiently. When information is available, agreements are in place, and national expertise is present, yet a crisis still occurs, the failure is no longer merely technical. It becomes a failure of governance, decision-making, and the ministry’s ability to absorb new realities and translate them into proactive policies.
Throughout the GERD dispute, Sudan has remained caught between Egypt’s view of the dam as a strategic threat and Ethiopia’s view of it as a development project. Yet Sudan’s national interest has never fully aligned with either perspective. Rather, it has required an independent approach based on Sudan’s own priorities, foremost among them safeguarding the lives of nearly 19 million Sudanese living along the Blue Nile and the Main Nile. Therefore, the existing technical arrangements should be utilized to strengthen water security and reduce risks, away from regional political polarization, because rivers are governed more by the principles of science and planning than by politics.
The statement issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation on 16 July carries significance beyond reassuring citizens. While it linked the drop in water levels to the beginning of storage at the GERD, it failed to explain the preventive measures taken to address the situation. This reinforces Professor Saif El-Din Hamad’s conclusions regarding the consequences of merging the Ministry of Water Resources, and confirms that water security is a sovereign issue that requires separating it from agriculture, given its central role in food security, energy, and national stability.
According to #Face_of_the_Truth, the issue is not the GERD alone, but the absence of mechanisms to manage Sudan’s relationship with it. Available information indicates that the joint technical committee responsible for coordination and information exchange with the Ethiopian side has not been holding its meetings, weakening Sudan’s ability to prepare for changes in the dam’s operation. Therefore, the most important lesson is not what the GERD has done, but what Sudan itself must do to ensure permanent institutional coordination that prevents such crises from recurring.
Wishing you continued health and well-being.
Tuesday, 21 July 2026
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