The Face of Truth | Ibrahim Shaglawi Before the First Shot
Not all wars begin with the first shot. Some begin when preparations are completed in the shadows, maps are drawn, roles are assigned, and then the bullet comes later to announce what had already been decided behind closed doors. Therefore, April 15 may not have been the beginning of the war, but rather the moment when a larger project was exposed, a project that faltered in its first hours and consequently turned from a swift coup into an open war.
Within this context, the recent statements made by the Governor of Darfur Region, Minni Arko Minnawi, on the Political Forum program of Sudan TV, acquire exceptional significance, as he was one of the principal actors in the political and security scene during the transitional period. Accordingly, what he presented can be read as testimony that warrants investigation, documentation, and comparison with other testimonies, because it touches upon one of the most obscure moments in the history of the Sudanese state.
According to Minnawi, the zero hour was not April 15, but was scheduled for Eid al-Fitr before events changed. He also spoke of arrangements to form a new government two weeks later, and of a celebration that was scheduled to take place in the Sebdo area to announce Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti” in a new political position, in the presence of foreign delegations. This was in addition to meetings held days before the war, during which he conveyed remarks attributed to Abdel Rahim Dagalo about arresting the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and another statement attributed to Hemedti that included an explicit threat to turn Khartoum into “a heap of ashes” if power was not handed over.
If these statements are proven, they do not merely reorder the chronology of events; they redefine their nature. We would not be facing a military confrontation that arose because of a clash at the Sports City, but rather a comprehensive political project that had a zero hour, a plan for taking control, a vision for the day after, and arrangements to announce a new authority. These are not the characteristics of a military rebellion, but rather the features of a political project aimed at seizing the state.
The most dangerous thing revealed by Minnawi’s testimony is not the timing of the zero hour, but the sequence of events. When the narrative speaks of a specific date, then a ready-made government, then a political celebration, followed by a speech overflowing with confidence in winning the battle, this suggests that military force was merely one of the project’s tools, while the objective was to engineer power according to new equations.
The significance of Minnawi’s testimony is further heightened because it does not stand alone before public opinion. Rather, its main aspects correspond with what Mr. Osman Mirghani, editor-in-chief of Al-Tayyar newspaper, presented in his statements and writings concerning the scenario of the outbreak of the war. This correspondence makes these important testimonies part of political and historical material that deserves official examination and documentation for history.
What is also striking is the location chosen for the celebration. The selection of the Sebdo area, historically associated with the visit of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and President Ibrahim Abboud in the 1960s, gives the place—if the account is correct—a symbolic dimension that goes beyond geography, as though the project had been intended to be an extension of a political project linked to Arab nationalism.
When the testimonies of actors and observers begin to point to the existence of indicators that preceded the war, the issue moves from explaining the moment when the shooting began to attempting to understand the environment that produced it. Here, the responsibility of the state becomes the transition from political debate to legal investigation, and from narratives to documented records and testimonies.
But Minnawi’s statements open a broader door than merely describing the plot. They raise a critical question about the size of the network that was operating at that time. A project of this magnitude cannot be understood as an isolated military effort, but rather as a project that required multiple levels of political, media, and logistical work and coordination, and perhaps regional and international coordination as well. Here, the question is no longer: Who fired the first shot? Rather: Who formulated the project to hijack the Sudanese state? Who prepared the political environment for it? And who was waiting for the announcement of the new authority?
On the other hand, this testimony raises a question concerning what was happening within state institutions at the time. If the warning signs were this clear, and if military mobilization, movements, speeches, and threats were known to a number of actors, why were no preventive measures taken to avert the explosion? Was the reason a lack of information? Or a misjudgment of the situation? Or fear that early action would lead to confrontation? Or were all the power balances within the state involved in the plan to varying degrees, in order to exclude a particular party? These are questions that should not be raised for the purpose of exchanging accusations, but rather to understand the mechanisms of decision-making in the most serious crisis faced by the Sudanese state since independence.
Here lies one of the most dangerous lessons of this narrative. Perhaps the party that had been planned for exclusion was too intelligent to be merely a victim; it read the plan from within and used its tools and experience to thwart it and turn it against its authors. The paradox is that those who considered it the weakest link may have been the most knowledgeable about the rules of the game. Therefore, the problem lay in underestimating the adversary and misreading the playing field.
Minnawi’s statements raise an even more dangerous question: What did the political forces know before the war? Who read its signals? Who misjudged them? And who chose silence or waiting? These are questions that narratives answer alongside documents and testimonies. The true value of the man’s account is that it shifts the discussion from how the war broke out to how the scene was reshaped before it erupted. A war may begin with a bullet, but it is prepared for long in the rooms of politics, alliances, and calculations of influence.
If Minni Arko Minnawi’s testimony has shed light on the final chapter preceding the outbreak of the war, it simultaneously opens the door to rereading the entire transitional period. Since the fall of President Omar al-Bashir’s regime in 2019, accounts have continued to circulate within political and security circles about the existence of documents, reports, and testimonies addressing what was taking place during that period, beginning with the sit-in at the General Command, passing through the political arrangements that followed it, and reaching the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the war. If such documents exist, their natural place is before independent national investigative committees, because they alone are capable of verifying their authenticity and connecting them to their circumstantial and historical context.
From this perspective, the files of the transitional period return to the forefront: international initiatives and mediation efforts, the United Nations mission, political activism, leading up to the Sudanese Bar Association’s draft constitution and the Framework Agreement. The question here is: Were these processes merely attempts to settle the crisis, or did they—intentionally or as a result of converging interests—constitute part of the preparation for the phase that was intended to follow the seizure of power and the reshaping of the state? A question that cannot be answered by impressions, but by documents, meeting minutes, and the testimonies of the actors involved.
Therefore, according to #The_Face_of_Truth, the writing of the history of the war should not begin on April 15, but with what preceded it. Truth does not begin with the first shot, but with what was being planned before it. If Minnawi’s testimony has opened this door, then the responsibility of the state is to turn narratives into documents and questions into investigations. Volker Türk, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, described the war as being fought by proxy out of a desire for the country’s resources. This makes the conflict more than merely a confrontation over power and opens the way to the reality of an attempt to hijack the state, its decision-making, and its resources. Understanding what came before the first shot is the proper understanding for protecting the future of the country.
May you remain in good health and well-being.
Sunday, August 9, 2026Shglawi55@gmail.com