The Truth Face | Ibrahim Shglawi Protests, Gray Zone Warfare, and National Security
It is well known that in moments of war, the rules of politics change, priorities are reshaped, and the state moves from the logic of managing differences to the logic of protecting existence. War is not merely an armed confrontation, but a battle over consciousness, over the cohesion of the internal front, and over the country’s ability to prevent the enemy from infiltrating through social and political interfaces.
From this perspective, what occurred on the anniversary of December 19 cannot be viewed as an ordinary protest, nor even as an act isolated from the reality of war, but rather as part of a broader scene in which threats intersect with national security and the battle to restore the state.
Sudan today is living through an existential war that targeted the capital, threatened the unity of the country, dismantled the social fabric, and opened the door to foreign interventions. In such a context, unity of ranks becomes a prerequisite for any discussion of democracy. Indeed, the literature on internal wars goes even further, considering that in times of war the state does not even listen to the enemy’s media, because any distortion of public awareness translates directly into losses on the battlefield.
Based on this principle, allowing protests—regardless of their justifications, size, or slogans—at a time when the armed forces are engaged in an open battle cannot be separated from their direct impact on the internal front. Protest here is less a political expression than it is a producer of negative effects: dispersing national effort, undermining morale, and sending signals abroad that suggest the fragmentation of the state.
More dangerous than the act itself is the identity of the forces behind it. These groups, according to facts not accusations, were not neutral when the war erupted. Rather, they sided with the militia politically, media-wise, and perhaps militarily, providing it with cover or justification, and remaining silent about its crimes. After Khartoum was liberated and the balance of power became clear, these forces repositioned themselves within the social fabric, waiting for a less costly moment to return to chaos in service of the militia’s agenda. We are therefore not facing a traditional opposition, but the remnants of a war that has not yet been dismantled, and intelligence networks attempting to reproduce themselves through soft tools after the tools of violence failed.
From a national security perspective, such movements perform three dangerous functions. First, they disrupt the state at a sensitive transitional moment from managing war to restoring recovery. Second, they undermine the morale of the armed forces and mobilized volunteers by creating a false impression of a divided street. Third, they send messages abroad that Khartoum has not regained its vitality and that the return of institutions remains in doubt.
Here the significance of timing emerges. These movements coincided with the announcement of the return of ministries and official institutions to Khartoum by the end of December, and with a gradual wave of citizens returning from inside and outside the country. The restoration of the capital as a center of decision-making represents a declaration of sovereignty and a turning point in the course of the war. This return threatens the militia and its supporters more than military battles do, because when the state returns to the capital, it closes the margins of chaos, disrupts external calculations, and confirms the restoration of security.
From this standpoint, it is not unlikely that these movements are part of a plan intelligently managed within what is known as “gray zone warfare”: creating limited chaos with significant political and media impact, to disrupt the return of institutions, intimidate citizens, and keep the image of the capital as an unstable city. It is an attempt to prevent the completion of recovery, not to impose legitimate political change.
What is established, according to sources, is that well-known political and organizational cadres, who previously played pivotal roles in weakening the structure of the state and undermining its authority, have over recent months quietly repositioned themselves under the umbrellas of foreign organizations active in Sudan—organizations that raise humanitarian and developmental slogans, but in practice have gone beyond their declared functions to become platforms for political activity, through which networks of funding, training, and media coordination are managed away from the eyes of oversight.
These cadres do not move out of spontaneous protest or peaceful pressure as is promoted, but within a long-term strategic vision carefully designed and adapted to the developments of the war. After the bet on toppling the state through arms faltered, the center of gravity shifted to dismantling it from within: exhausting the internal front, draining institutional capacities, diverting public attention, and undermining trust between citizens and state institutions at a highly sensitive time.
In contrast, the real challenge lies in distinguishing between the right to expression in times of peace and the manipulation of the public sphere in times of war. Democracy is not abolished, but postponed in favor of a higher priority: the survival of the state. Pluralism is not practiced under bombardment, and freedom is not built upon the wounds of a nation whose blood has not yet dried.
The structural dilemma does not stop at the street, but extends to the summit of the state. The absence of centralized decision-making, the multiplicity of power centers, and the hybrid form of governance all weaken the state’s ability to act decisively and open the door to miscalculations. No state is effectively governed by a multi-headed council in a moment of war. Political and security decisiveness does not mean exclusion, but clarity of responsibility and linking decision-making to accountability.
The conclusion, according to #The_Truth_Face, is that what is happening is inseparable from the existential battle our country is fighting. Every crack in the internal front, every distortion of the hierarchy of priorities, and every invocation of pre-war discourse serves—intentionally or unintentionally—the enemy. Unity of ranks is not a political luxury, but a condition for survival. Today, the state comes first, the army is its backbone, and awareness is its shield. Anything else, no matter how adorned with slogans, is nothing but dangerous folly that must be decisively addressed. The state stands on the edge.
Wishing you well-being and good health.
Sunday, 21 December 2025
Shglawi55@gmail.com