Face of Truth | Ibrahim Shaghlawi Post-War Economy and International Mediation…

 

We begin this article with an important question through which we attempt to understand the rapid developments related to the peace file in Sudan—some of which are visible, while others remain hidden: why have international pressures accelerated at the very moment the army is advancing?

The question of peace in Sudan is no longer merely a moral or humanitarian one; it has turned into a political–economic equation, where battlefield calculations intersect with investment bets, and where two narratives clash: the narrative of the state, which sees military resolution as a prerequisite for sovereignty, and the narrative of international powers, which view “rapid peace” as a gateway to reordering Sudan’s political and economic market.

U.S. President Trump’s statement yesterday that the end of the conflict in Sudan has become “very imminent,” along with his references to a donors’ conference and broad support for reconstruction, forms a key pillar for understanding the current political and economic landscape.

This coincides with what the U.S. Department of State announced regarding the launch of a humanitarian fund to support Sudan, which has gathered financial pledges totaling $1.5 billion, including $200 million from the United States.

The initiative aims to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid to the most vulnerable groups and to enhance burden-sharing among donors, with expectations of a meeting to be held on April 15 in Berlin to mobilize additional support. The event will also involve U.S. officials and the United Nations.

It is clear that the American discourse is not limited to peace or humanitarian support; rather, it opens the door to wide investment opportunities in Sudan, given its geostrategic location overlooking the Red Sea and its rich natural resources.

Here, peace becomes a dual tool: protecting U.S. interests in the region and securing massive economic opportunities for investment and reconstruction, presented to Sudan behind closed doors as an incentive to end the war quickly.

This is perhaps confirmed by the announcement of the Senior Adviser to the U.S. President for Arab and African Affairs, Massad Boulos, regarding reaching a final formula for an imminent agreement as political cover for this approach. Yet, at the same time, it reveals the limited credibility of the international Quartet as an acceptable framework for any potential settlement: for Sudanese audiences, the mechanisms of troop withdrawal and accelerated humanitarian aid are often used to entrench areas of control by the Rapid Support Forces militia, rather than to end the rebellion or protect civilians.

Likewise, every time the army achieves an advance, these calls emerge as political cover for attempts to rearrange influence in favor of the militia, rather than as a step toward genuine peace.

On the other hand, the Sudanese army has continued to consolidate its control on the ground. President al-Burhan affirmed that the army is “coming to liberate El Fasher,” while Lieutenant General Shams al-Din Kabashi stressed the continuation of operations until the “complete cleansing of the homeland,” without any negotiation with the militia.

These victories are considered a true foundation for entrenching national sovereignty, granting Khartoum the ability to impose its conditions on any mediation.

Here, the importance of the reconstruction card emerges, transcending economic dimensions. The Sudanese government possesses the ability to employ it to reinforce its national vision for a solution: by considering the Rapid Support Forces militia as a rebellion that must be ended, paving the way for disarming its elements, demobilizing them, and reintegrating them outside the political process, and turning reconstruction into a tool for rebuilding the state—not a platform for distributing investment contracts to foreign companies or to a local or regional oligarchic class that may control the settlement project and the country’s political and economic resources.

This class, if it emerges, will be part of a political–economic system operating in the shadows, determining who profits from peace and who controls the future of the country and its resources.

On the diplomatic front, the Prime Minister’s visit to Geneva appears to confirm the national strategy: shifting the center of gravity from battlefields to arenas of international legitimacy, transforming the language of force into the language of the state, and marketing the “Government of Hope” peace initiative as the sole international reference for any potential settlement.

Meetings with human rights organizations, the World Health Organization, and refugee agencies aim to reshape Sudan’s narrative: from a country of crisis to a state of project, from an exhausted nation to a state seeking a peace built on law and the will of Sudanese—not on external tutelage or the balance of regional and international interests.

This is supported by an internal logic that sees any peace without dismantling the rebellion as a reproduction of the crisis. In this context, the Prime Minister’s visit to Geneva is an attempt to redefine the crisis in Sudanese terms on the international stage.

The visit also builds three parallel tracks: affirming moral legitimacy by linking violations to an armed rebellion rather than a power struggle, and repositioning the state within international humanitarian law; transforming humanitarian sympathy into political support by linking relief, health, and refugee files to peace as a root solution, not merely a humanitarian truce.

Also, preparing the international stage to recognize the Sudanese peace initiative as the sole reference for any potential settlement, and closing the door to parallel initiatives. In this sense, the initiative is no longer an internal document, but a state project marketed internationally, in the face of attempts to reduce the war to an internal conflict.

The final message is clear: according to #Face_of_Truth, peace in Sudan is not merely a truce, but a project of political–economic reordering within what is known as the post-war economy, through which international mediation becomes active.

Therefore, military victories, accompanied by political and diplomatic discourse, and reconstruction according to a national vision, make any international pressure or mediation tied solely to Khartoum’s conditions—so that Sudan may write new rules for mediation, and transform peace into an instrument of national sovereignty before it becomes an economic opportunity for others, affirming that authority is not granted, but seized and imposed.

Stay well and in good health.

Saturday, February 7, 2026

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